Passkeys in Consumer Banking: WebAuthn, FIDO2 and Fraud Vectors
How FIDO2 passkeys replace passwords in financial apps, public-key cryptography, hardware enclaves, and account-takeover resistance.
Second factors in banking apps, account-takeover and SIM-swap exposure, and the settings worth changing today.
How FIDO2 passkeys replace passwords in financial apps, public-key cryptography, hardware enclaves, and account-takeover resistance.
A security architect's analysis of credential stuffing, session hijacking, SIM swapping, and MFA fatigue in modern bank account takeovers.
Evaluating FIDO2 / WebAuthn passkeys in banking apps, phishing resistance, credential recovery, and current European bank support.
Attackers do not defeat your second factor. They use the process built for people who lost it. How recovery chains work and where they break.
Push-based second factors fail to a simple attack: ask repeatedly until someone taps approve. Why it works, and the three controls that stop it.
Two factors from three categories, plus dynamic linking that binds the code to the amount and payee. Why SCA blocks some fraud and not other kinds.
SMS one-time codes are the weakest common second factor and remain the most deployed. The reasons are coverage, cost and recovery — not ignorance.
How an attacker takes over your phone number, why SMS codes are the weak link, and the settings to change at your carrier, your bank and your email.